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ACTING CHAIR: REPRESENTATIVE JIM SAXTON (R-NJ)

LOCATION: 2118 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

WITNESSES: GENERAL PETER SCHOOMAKER, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF; GENERAL MICHAEL HAGEE, MARINE CORPS COMMANDANT; LT. GENERAL NORTON SCHWARTZ, DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, JOINT STAFF; LT. GENERAL JAMES CARTWRIGHT, DIRECTOR FOR FORCE STRUCTURE, RESOURCES AND ASSESSMENT, JOINT STAFF

BODY:

REP. SAXTON: (Gavel.) Committee will come to order. This morning, the committee kicks off the new year with an opportunity to learn about the most significant large-scale rotation of American military forces since World War II.

Chairman Hunter has asked me to fill in for him today as he was unable to make the necessary travel connections last night. He sends his regrets and also wishes to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for agreeing to appear today on this important topic.

It's a pleasure to welcome our witnesses today. General Peter J. Schoomaker, chief of staff of the Army, will be with us shortly. Just for everybody's information, the general is at the White House, and he will be here as soon as he possibly can. General Michael Hagee, commandant Marine Corps; Lieutenant General Norton Schwartz, director of operations of the Joint Chiefs — Joint Staff, and Lieutenant General James Cartwright, director of force structure, resources and assessment of the Joint Staff.

Gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony.

As Washington prepares to consider the president's budget defense proposal for the coming fiscal year, it is critically important that Congress gain a better understanding of one of the most crucial national security issues we face, the global war on terror, and how the U.S. military will accommodate its growing requirements.

How the Department of Defense and each of the military services as force providers choose to meet this challenge will in many respects shape the U.S. military for many years to come.

Decisions on active-reserve mix, mobilization and rotation rates, force protection, personnel tempo and other key issues are already and will continue to have a lasting impact on our all-volunteer force.

On the other hand, the situation also provides an unprecedented opportunity to examine long-standing personnel and organization policy, since most of the underlying assumptions used to build today's force decades ago are about to be put to severe tests.

Let me now recognize the ranking member for his statement, my friend Ike Skelton.

REP. IKE SKELTON (D-MO): Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses. We look

forward to General Schoomaker being here with us in a few minutes. General Hagee, thank you for joining us today. General Cartwright and General Schwartz, we thank you also for sharing your insights with us.

The activities with which we are engaged in Iraq, subduing the guerrilla conflict — and we should not mistake what it is; it is truly a guerrilla war as opposed to what some may call terrorists — subduing this guerrilla conflict and rebuilding a government are unprecedented since the days of the Second World War.

We now face a troop rotation on a scale of also unseen proportion. I want to commend all of our witnesses for the care with which this rotation is being handled. It really gives one pause to consider the logistical feat that's involved.

The force taking over in Iraq is smaller than the force that is leaving. Now, while I understand the argument that a smaller force can have greater capability, they must still cover the same amount of ground and deal with the same size Iraqi population.

Moreover, while the numbers of Iraqi security forces continue to grow, their training and capability remain uneven at best. Our forces have exceptional training and are undoubtedly up to the task.

But all this is particularly important in the next six months as we transfer sovereignty to the Iraqis. It's critically important that this transfer happen in a stable security environment.

Beyond Iraq, I'm concerned that the ongoing need for substantial troop numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue to strain our overall force, particularly the reserve element. This does not mean we should pull back from our commitments. We can't unring the bell. We're there. We've got to win. We've got to stabilize that country. We cannot afford that to devolve into a civil war. And recently the CIA, in an article that was recently published, evidently is concerned about that issue.

Instead we must increase our active-duty strength so that we don't break our current force. Lieutenant General John Riggs, who is currently examining this issue for the Army, agrees and recently said that the Army likely needs substantially more than a 10,000-soldier increase. This is a medium-to long-term solution. It's one that we must begin now. And when General Schoomaker gets here, we'll be interested in asking him questions about that.

And, again, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you, Mr. Skelton. Before turning to our witnesses, let me briefly cover two administrative items. First, both General Schoomaker and General Hagee have hard commitments that they have to be back at the Pentagon at 1:00 and a back door on our time here, and so I would urge everyone to ask concise questions so that we can move through the entire committee.

Second, it's entirely likely that elements of today's discussion can only be discussed in a classified session. So we may need to shift into executive session at some point if it becomes necessary to fully explore classified details.

I hope that doesn't happen. I think we're going to get a sweep across the big picture here today. However, if it does become necessary, we'll have to adjourn and go up to 2212, which has been swept and is ready to accommodate our need, should we need to go classified.

So with that, we'll hear from our witnesses. Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us this morning. We appreciate this. And we'll start with General Schwartz.

GEN. SCHWARTZ: Mr. Chairman, good morning. Thank you for having us before the committee. And with your permission, I'll make a few introductory comments to put the rotation plan that we're currently executing in perspective.

The slides which you have at your table and which are shown to my left and right reflect, at a macro level, what we are undertaking at this point. The current set in what we are calling Operation Iraqi Freedom I is four divisions and about 17 brigade equivalents. Those divisions are the 82nd, the First Armored — the 82nd being in the west — the First Armored, which is in the Baghdad area, Fourth Infantry in the north-central sector of Iraq, and 101st in the north.

The transition will occur, and, in fact, it is now underway. We have completed the deployment of some 13,000 personnel so far of the 100-plus that will occur over the next few months. Those divisions will transition to a three-division set, with about 14 brigade equivalents, led by the First Marine Expeditionary Force in the western sector, the First Cavalry Division in Baghdad, and the First Infantry Division in the north-central sector.

In addition, there are additional elements providing for security of both lines of communications and fixed facilities,

that currently being performed by two elements from the Florida and Indiana National Guard, being succeeded by the 81st Enhanced Separate Brigade from Washington and California.

In addition, of course, there is a logistical set that's associated with the major combat units. That theater support command will remain in Iraq while some of its personnel will transition. And, of course, all of the combat service support units that range from company to brigade size transition as well.

These personnel for the Army will be on tours of up to 12 months, and in the case of the Marines, approximately seven months. The overall numbers of combat support and combat service support personnel will diminish between the first and the second rotation. That is achieved primarily by contracting initiatives which have occurred since we deployed the initial personnel last year at this time, and also other efficiencies which are gained. And those numbers go from about 66,000 on the support side to about 50,000.

It is an important point to make, I think, that imperative for us in working the plans which were ultimately vetted by the joint chiefs and recommended to the secretary was to maintain competency on the ground for those units that naturally have a year's experience in the area of operation now and those which will succeed them. And so we worked to maintain this competency in a number of ways.

And a couple of points. The staff of Combined Joint Task Force Seven — that is General Sanchez's organization — the key staff and leadership will not transition when the Fifth Corps, which comprises most of that headquarters, transitions to Three Corps here in the next couple of months. The key personnel will remain.

In addition, we did our best to assure that at least one brigade was either deployed early to a division sector or remained in the division sector in order to provide stability and continuity during the transition in that sector. The case in point would be the first brigade of the First Infantry Division, which is remaining in the western sector as the Marines come on board.

In addition, this transition plan is not a spike. It is actually one that started in December and will continue through May. It's four or five months. And that was a deliberate effort, again, to assure that we maintain a sufficient level of continuity in each of the sectors.

Of note as well is the effort that it took to prepare the force for deployment. That preparation began as long ago as the summer and August of last year. Typically leaders made visits to the theater, certainly at the division level and in many cases at the brigade level.

Those leaders went to Iraq and visited with the folks that they were going to succeed and exchanged face-to-face information, so that the training plans that were implemented and accomplished in the intervening period were specific to the needs of their location.

The inbound units will come into theater and will spend about two weeks or so in Kuwait, first linking up with their equipment and then preparing for the environmental aspects of the theater and preparing to move to their battle stations in Iraq.

Once they move into Iraq, there will be at least a two-week handoff between the unit which is currently there and the one that will be succeeding it. That two-week handoff, the terminology typically used is "left seat, right seat" to make sure that the new personnel gain the benefit of the experiences of the earlier and departing unit.

So that is the major features of the game plan to maintain continuity at the unit level.

Now, at the leadership level there was a similar effort made. As I mentioned earlier, the Three Corps is succeeding Fifth Corps from Europe as the corps of the Combined Joint Task Force Seven headquarters. The first visits from Lieutenant General Tom Metz, the Three Corps commander, to theater began last September and continued through November. He and General Sanchez interacted, and so did his principal staff members.

In November, there was a major training iteration which included mission rehearsals for the headquarters. That involved both Metz's Three Corps and Sanchez's CJTF7, which concluded in December with a certification exercise which was orchestrated and evaluated by the Joint Forces Command, Admiral Giambastiani, and company, which certified Three Corps as ready to assume the leadership of the mission in Iraq. And that deployment began earlier this month and will continue through April. So, once again, the transition of the headquarters will occur over several months rather than over a very tight period.

One other subject to address before I conclude, Mr. Chairman, relates to the tour lengths of personnel in Iraq. You will recall that the leadership of the department on numerous occasions has articulated that the standard is up to 12 months boots on the ground.

In working the transition plan, there are roughly 1250 units which are redeploying from Iraq as a part of this rotation. Initially, in November of last year, we identified some 267 units, about 20,000 personnel altogether, who we were looking at as perhaps being in a situation where we might have to extend certain people beyond that 12 months boots on the ground in order to ensure that we had overlap between the outgoing and the incoming unit.

We worked this very hard, implemented a number of mitigation measures; I'll address those in a second. But ultimately we reduced that 267 units to 12. It turned out to be 1,567 personnel specifically. Nine units of the 12 were of greater than 60 days. The longest extension is — I should say nine of the 12 were more than 15 days. The longest will be 60 days. And three were less than or equal to 15.

Of those 12 units, two were reserves, one unit from the Illinois National Guard and one unit from the Washington State Guard.

Now some of the things we did to try to minimize these extensions included increasing through-put through the ports, both air and sea, in order to maximize the flow of personnel into theater. We also used some amphibious shipping in order to optimize, again, the use of the Ash Shuaybah commercial port as well as the other ports available in Kuwait.

Very importantly, we implemented a strategy of using stay-behind equipment. So in many cases, units simply would fall in on the equipment that the preceding organization used, and we only had to transport the personnel and not their accompanying equipment. That certainly assisted.

We compressed both the mobilization and training times on the front end and did our best to compress the what we call reception staging and onward movement, as well as the handoff that I talked about earlier on the back end.

And finally, we used something called joint sourcing. About 5,000 or so Navy and Air Force personnel actually will be performing ground-force functions in this rotation because there were shortfalls in the force. For example, the Air Force is providing truck drivers and the Navy as well, and the engineers and the like.

So those elements were the major features of our effort, number one, to maintain continuity on the ground between units; number two, maintain that continuity in the leadership cadre; and then, finally, to assure that we were as loyal to our commitment on up to 365 days boots on the ground as we could possibly be and still sustain the mission.

Mr. Chairman, those are my introductory remarks, sir. And after our colleagues make additional comments, I'll be happy to take your questions. Thank you, sir.

REP. SAXTON: General Schwartz, thank you very much. General Cartwright.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Rather than do any introductory remarks, Mr. Chairman, I'm happy to be here. I'm willing and ready to take your questions. And I'll pass my time to the service chiefs.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you very much. General Hagee?

GEN. HAGEE: Chairman Saxton, Congressman Skelton, distinguished members of this committee, it is truly my pleasure to report on your Marine Corps and our participation in operations in support of the global war on terrorism.

I thank the members of this committee for your continued support of your Marines. Let me assure you that the Marine Corps' first priority is and will continue to be war-fighting readiness and excellence in support of our nation's security.

I've had the opportunity to talk with Marines after major combat operations, and I also had the opportunity talk with them before they crossed the line of departure last year. And what they continue to tell me is that your support, the support of the Congress and the support of the American people, are the two most important things to them. And your support in funding, your support when you articulate how much you respect what they're doing over there, and your trips over there mean a great deal to all the servicemen and women who are deployed throughout the world.

During this past year, the Marine Corps, both active and reserve, was engaged in operations from Afghanistan to the Arabian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, Liberia, Georgia Republic, Colombia, Guantanamo Bay and the Philippines. Most prominent in highlighting the value and power of the nation's naval expeditionary capability was the Marine Corps' participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The First Marine Expeditionary Force deployed a combat-ready force of about 70,000 Marines and sailors in less than 60 days. Exploiting the operational speed, reach and inherent flexibility of sea power, the Navy and the Marine Corps, closely integrated with joint and coalition and special operations forces, engaged in 26 days of sustained combat operations and fought 10 major engagements, destroying eight Iraqi divisions before stopping in Tikrit almost 500 miles inland.

Following major combat operations, First Marine Expeditionary Force assumed responsibility for security and stability operations in five central Iraqi provinces until they were relieved of the last province by coalition forces just last September.

Since the end of major combat operations, the Marine Corps has been setting the force in order to enhance and maintain war-fighting readiness for future contingencies. Reloading of combat equipment and materiel on maritime prepositioned force shipping is nearly complete.

We are using provided funding to repair, refurbish and, where necessary, replace equipment. During this period, Marines have continued to forward-deploy and Marine Corps units have continued to support numerous operations, to include Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and operations in the Horn of Africa.

We have conducted a major program to identify and analyze lessons learned from this campaign. We have also begun to assimilate these lessons and determine where and how our force should be rebalanced.

The Marine Corps is currently preparing to deploy forces to relieve the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 82nd Airborne Division in western Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II. These forces will be deployed in two rotations of approximately seven months each.

This rotation policy will result in the least disruption for the long-term health of your Marine Corps, precluding stop-loss/stop-move and unnecessary interruptions in recruit training, career progression and development, professional military education and other deployment requirements.

The first rotation, from March until approximately September of this year, will include 25,000 Marines and their equipment. And this includes almost 3,000 reserve component Marines. A second rotation of approximately the same size and composition will overlap the first and ensure a smooth and stable transition.

In preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom II, First Marine Expeditionary Force has analyzed lessons learned from their experiences in conducting security and stability operations from March to September of last year and recent Army lessons learned.

As they did last year, First Marine Expeditionary Force is already working closely with U.S. Army forces in Iraq. They have conducted a number of liaison visits with the Army units that they will relieve. They have drawn from procedures used by the Los Angeles police department for neighborhood patrolling in gang-dominated areas, the tactics of the British in Iraq, which reflect years of experience in low-intensity conflicts and peacekeeping operations, as well as our own extensive small-war knowledge.

We have assimilated these lessons through a comprehensive training package that includes tactics, techniques, procedures for stability and counter-insurgency operations. We have conducted rigorous urban operations and exercises. Over 400 Marines are receiving Arabic language immersion training, and all deploying Marines and sailors are receiving extensive cultural education.

Our supporting establishment is focused on the equipment, logistical and training requirements of the force, paying particular attention to individual protective equipment, enhanced vehicle and aircraft hardening, and aviation survival equipment and procedures.

While the operational tempo remains high, recruiting and retention continue to exceed our goals. During this next year, Marine expeditionary units will still deploy. Units will still rotate to Japan. Some of these forces will deploy from Japan in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II.

We are diligently ensuring that the Marine Corps remains ready for all of our current and future responsibilities.

I look forward to presenting a more detailed statement on the current posture of your Marine Corps when I return before this committee on the 12th of February.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.

REP. SAXTON: General Hagee, thank you very much. We've been joined by Chief of Staff of the Army General Schoomaker. Welcome aboard, sir. And we're ready to hear your statement.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I apologize for being late. I think you know why.

REP. SAXTON: Yes, sir.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: And I have submitted a statement for the record. I would just like to make a very brief opening comment here, and that is I appreciate the opportunity to be here today. You know it's an exciting time to be in the Army, a tough time in many ways, but in other ways it's very fulfilling, and I really appreciate the opportunity to be back with the men and women in uniform, and everyday I continue to be reinforced by their courage and their dedication, their selfless service.

As you know, I just returned from Christmas from the theater, both Afghanistan and Iraq. A member of the committee here, Congressman Jim Marshall, accompanied me on that — appreciated his counsel and his company. But, again, tremendously reinforced by what I saw there, and encouraged about where we're going in the future. So I will stand by for your questions, sir.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you, general. Why don't we start our questioning with the ranking member, Mr. Skelton, for whatever thoughts or questions you may have.

REP. SKELTON: General, let me welcome you and thank you for being with us today. I hear the phrase from time to time, "breaking the Army," so let me tell you I'm concerned with the depths of challenges that now face the Army. They've reached such a level that we're starting to see folks who previously did not speak publicly, discussing serious problems in the press.

First, Jeff Record (ph) of the U.S. Army War College published a piece arguing that the administration has dangerously confused the war in Iraq with the global war on terrorism, undertaking a strategic error of the first order, with the result of an unnecessary preventative war of choice against a deterred Iraq that had created a new front in the Middle East for Islamic terrorism, and divert attention and resources away from securing the American homeland, against further assault by a terrible al Qaeda.

The ongoing conflict and reconstruction effort in Iraq, as we know, has put continuing demands on our force. This in part led Lieutenant General John Riggs to conclude and say publicly that the Army likely needs substantially more than a 10,000-soldier increase. My own view is that the solution lies more in the neighborhood of 40,000, based upon testimony going back to 1995.

If we don't fix this problem soon, we're in danger of seeing more of the problem identified. And again cited publicly by Lieutenant General James Helmly, head of the Army Reserve — that's number three — he told the Washington Post last week that the Reserves faced a potential retention crisis once stop-loss is lifted.

General, with these problems now prominently discussed by senior officers in the media, how is the Army addressing issues of retention and of right-sizing our force by increasing end strength?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Sir, I'd like to approach it from the front end of your statement to the rear. First of all, there are lots of opinions, and I encourage as we go forward here that — you know, the people have their opinions. I would hope they would discuss them with me before they're discussed in the press. But, nevertheless, everyone has their right to express themselves as they see fit.

There's no question the Army is stressed, and that the degree to which we are engaged today, in what is a very important endeavor in my opinion, can't be debated. It is clear that we are committed to that.

What we are doing is trying to transform the Army simultaneous with meeting the security commitments of the nation. The retention last year, 2003, as I have testified before and spoken in the press, we met our goals 100 percent across the board with one exception, and that was in the Army Reserve, mid-careerists, which we missed by six percent. And this was at a time when their primary source of people that come into the Reserve, with their primary source are people that are leaving active duty, was cut off as a result of stop-loss, stop-move. So I think that's pretty laudable.

So far this year the indications are we are on track right now for 100 percent of goal across all components, active,

Guard and Reserve.

Now, there is no question that as we continue to operate at the level that we are, and if we don't make some significant moves, which we are in the process of doing, to increase the predictability and the stability, not only in the lives of the soldiers, but in the lives of their families, that this is something that is clearly on our mind and we're working.

Right now I've been given the authority by the secretary of Defense to grow the Army by 30,000 people within the authority that he has under emergency powers that he has under the law, Title 10. And to do that, to buy the opportunity to restructure the Army, which is what we're doing, and we are in very serious moods right now, looking at modularizing the Army, standardizing it, developing an Army that's more lethal, more agile, more capable of meeting the current and future operating environment tasks. And that is what we are into right now.

This has been ongoing. You and I have had private conversations on this, and other members have as well. But what I stress again is that we should not make a commitment to permanent end strength increase at this time with the cost of that incurred and placed upon us in the future years, because we will drive ourselves back into the kind of Army I joined in the late Vietnam era, early '70s, which was an Army of a lot of people that was hollow — couldn't train, couldn't move, couldn't fly — couldn't do the kinds of things that the Army was required. It cost us, our estimate is \$1.2 billion for every 10,000 people that we add to the Army. And the worst thing in the world we should get is legislated end strength increase that we're forced to meet within our current level of budget, and incur that in the out-years. And I'm adamant that that is not the way to go, that if we can structure the Army in a way through this temporary growth, and when we look for internal efficiencies, we've already started to take, we think we can get 10,000 spaces through military-to-civilian conversion. We think by stabilizing the Army, where we don't move the Army every two to three years on an individual basis, but we keep people in place, develop cohesive, stable units where spouses can work, where kids can go to school, where people can invest in homes and develop equity, stabilize this force — it's better for the fighting force, it's better for the families, and it will increase our retention. So by stabilizing that rotational base we've got — we have 63,000 people today in constant motion — through the training system, through coming into the Army, leaving the Army, PCSing between places. Forty percent of those moves, they are discretionary moves having to do with Korea, because of the individual replacement system. And these efficiencies have to be taken.

And then we also believe we are going to get significant efficiencies as we reposition and restructure our overseas overhead and headquarters in a way that will also give us people.

So as we get our temporary bump up while we take these efficiencies, I believe we can bring it back down within the current targets, operate more effectively with a better Army more capable of doing what it needs to do within our current level of resourcing. And that is the strategy which we are pursuing today. So I hope, sir, that this addresses your question.

REP. SKELTON: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. SAXTON: We are going to go to Mr. McHugh next. But before we do, General, you spoke in rather general terms about restructuring the Army. Could you be a little bit more specific and say what it is more precisely you intend to do?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Yes, sir, I can. On the active side of the Army currently we are authorized 10 divisions in the active force. Our intention is to retain the 10 division headquarters at battle command headquarters, but take much of the enabling resources — the air defense, the signal and all of the enablers that are in the division base — and push them down to brigade level and increase the number of brigades under each one of those divisions. So tentatively we think we can go from three brigades under a division to four under each. That takes us from 30 brigades within the division structure to 40 brigades.

We also as you know have made a decision to go forward with Striker. That gives us five Striker brigades within the active structure. It also gives us two airborne brigades and an armored cavalry regiment. One of the armored cavalry regiments, the 2nd light armored cavalry regiment, is designated to become one of the Strikers. So it's included in those numbers.

So that moves us from 33 current active brigades under 10 division headquarters to a force of 48 active brigades — more lethal, more capable, more agile, more modular — that will allow us to be much more strategically agile than we are today. Today we have six heavy divisions in the active force. All of them are different. Today we have two light divisions in the active force — each of them are different. Then we have an 82nd Airborne Division and 101st, and of course they're different. This we need to fix during this time.

On the Reserve side and the Active Guard currently we have eight active Guard division headquarters, which we'll retain. But we want to go from 15 enhanced brigades that we have today to 22 — increase their level of readiness and equip them along the lines of what we are doing today with the 30th, the 39th and 81st, with the very best equipment available as they go forth, and increase their capability to become part of a broader rotation base to meet the future strategy.

And then below all of that — all of that combat service support, combat support, and the rest of it — over 100,000 structural changes to be made. We are going to convert 36 field artillery battalions to 149 MP units. We are going to increase the amount of transportation assets, medical, aviation restructuring. It's huge. The biggest — this is the biggest internal Army kind of restructuring we have done in 50 years. But it must be done to make us relevant and ready to meet the strategy and the real threat to the United States as we know it today, as opposed to the Cold War or the World War II level threat.

REP. SAXTON: And what will it do to your plan if you get a legislated increase in end strength?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: If we get a legislated increase in end strength without the money — and, by the way, on the '04 authorization bill that just came into effect, we were raised 2,400 spaces — 2,400 spaces, and there was no money that came with them. If that happens at a major level, then we are caused to eat that money from inside of our program at the tune of \$1.2 billion for 10,000 people. And one division costs 30,000 people — take us two years to generate. My view is it puts our readiness at risk, it puts training at risk, it puts modernization at risk, it puts transformation at risk. And that's why I'm resisting it.

The secretary of Defense, I've presented him with a plan — he has given me the authority to do — gives me the head room under his current authorities to grow the Army — not raise the end strength, but to grow the Army, to give me the bump that I need to be able to do these internal structures. And I believe that we can deliver that kind of Army over the next four years that we need.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you very much. Mr. McHugh.

REP. JOHN MCHUGH (R-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, let me just — General Schoomaker, good morning, sir, and thank you to all of you gentlemen for being here, and thank you most importantly to the service chiefs and the magnificent men and women you make available to the service of this country. I've been to Iraq twice now. I've been to Uzbekistan. I'm going to take a trip over to Afghanistan in a few weeks, and it's just incredible the way — all very, very proud of them and proud of you for providing the leadership to make sure that happens.

General Schoomaker, I want to make sure I understand some of your comments here today. The secretary has given you the option of going to 30,000 additional troops, saying that he has waived under the emergency declaration provisions the statutory cap on end strength?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: That's correct.

REP. MCHUGH: How long does the secretary intend to declare that emergency to waive that limit?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Well, sir, I'm not sure we can see into the future as far as we need to, but I've asked him to do that for the duration of the emergency, or to four years. I think I need four years to do this.

REP. MCHUGH: And therein you use the word "temporary." And you were gracious enough to drop by my office when you came out of what I thought you described a pretty peaceful and happy retirement to take up this. I admire you and — well, I'm going to keep out your way, because I question your stability. (Laughs.) But and by that I mean simply why anybody would want to take up this challenge so willingly can only be described as love of the Army, and I have deep respect for that. But you are new to this challenge in that position, but 90 percent of what has been said here this morning, with all due respect, is something that we have been hearing for years, that the secretary of Defense and others come up here and they talk about rebalancing the Reserve component and the active component. They talk about taking military uniform out of civilian positions and moving them into the Army — in this case into military positions. And yet in all of that time we have not seen one cent to achieve any of that. And that's the frustration for many of us, and the ranking member and others who have been concerned about this end strength, because we are dealing now in a three-to four-year period in retrospect, and you're talking about a four-year period on the other end. And I trust that's probably your best guess, but probably a best-case scenario as well. We're talking about a lot of time and a lot of people's lives.

As I understand it, and I believe in my heart of hearts that you respect that effect on those lines as well. As I understand it your transition would be increasing the modular capabilities of your two divisions as you bring them back and increasing

the combat brigades, which makes a lot of sense. That requires 10,000 more additional — more additional — more support personnel. Is that not true?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: I'm not quite sure —

REP. MCHUGH: Well, to create what you're looking to create, and just shifting the numbers actually creates a greater need of about 10,000 people in uniform to provide the support for those brigades.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: I'm not sure that that number is accurate. If you want to create a division — in the way that we created divisions in the past, it takes about 30,000 people across the force to generate a 15,000-to 17,000-person division. We are creating a different kind of force.

I differ with you a little bit. I don't differ with you on the sanity check — my wife — you have to get in line right behind her on this.

REP. MCHUGH: That was a poor — unartful choice of words.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: But I do differ with you. I think if you take a look — number one, we achieved already approximately 5,000 savings on the mil-to-civ conversion on this last year, and we think we can do that again this year. If you take a look and see that we have already created two Striker brigades, we're creating the third, and posturing for the fourth, I think that's significant restructuring and transformation that's taking place there.

If you take a look at some of the things we've already done — 3rd Infantry Division, as it is resetting right now, is going through major experimentation in terms of what things should look like. I think that we are making some progress. And I would caution everybody here. One of the reasons it's so difficult to transform outside of the context of the current kind of emergency is that the amount of energy it takes to develop momentum within a stable force is huge. What we have now is a force in motion and under stress, and highly motivated to transform itself. We should take advantage, both for fiscal reasons and for national security reasons, we should take advantage of this movement that we currently have to reset and transform during this emergency. And that's what gives me the encouragement that in fact we can do this.

REP. MCHUGH: Well, I appreciate that. We've got internal information — and by internal I mean that the committee possesses — that suggests that you are going to need additional troop strength or personnel to create those resets. That's something we need to keep an eye on.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Sir, could I redress just real quickly —

REP. MCHUGH: Absolutely —

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: — you know, because I'm not sure I'm making myself clear. If you take a look at the delta between what we can generate within our current end strength, which could be from 20,-to 30,000 people we're restructuring — that's stabilization so that we get garners for people out of TJHS (ph) — that's mil-to-civ conversions. That is restructuring as a result of the headquarters overhead that we've got right now in place like Korea and Germany and elsewhere that we will garner some savings out of. And then — so that's within our current authorization.

And then you take a look at the temporary hump. You are talking about a delta between 40,-and 60,000 people we've got to use, that we've already paid for and we have the authority to use. And that's the opportunity here. That's the window of opportunity that we have that we haven't had that we are trying to take advantage of. And I think it's prudent for the taxpayer, I think it's prudent for the Army in terms of its future that we take advantage of this opportunity, and do this now, which is what we're trying to do. I really counsel against incurring permanent end strength increases within the program, because it can only be paid one way: modernization, training, resetting. That's where you are going to pay for that with — what would the force do?

REP. MCHUGH: If I may, to the extent we don't provide the money. And let me just close, because we're operating the lights here, but I don't want to be hoggish about the time. I'd close on two points we agree with. I think all of us support the initiative that you've outlined, and I don't want to make it sound like it's all cold gruel, because it is not. You have brought your own redesign to this that I compliment you for, and I think it definitely deserves to be pursued, and holds a great deal of promise. So speaking for myself, I certainly look forward to helping you and supporting you on that to the extent that's helpful.

Second of all, I could not agree more the last thing we want to do is recreate the scenarios of the '70s where you had the hollow force. And certainly I know — I spoke to the chairman and the committee within the last 24 hours — he feels

very strongly that should end strength increases be there, they have to be funded, because no one is looking for you to have to find out how to hide. That would be, I agree again, devastating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you very much. Mr. Taylor?

REP. GENE TAYLOR (D-MS): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank again all of you gentlemen for what you do and for what the troops who you lead do.

Two things I'd like you to address. Number one, several soldiers brought it to my attention that they were getting ready to PCS, that the unit they were PCSing to was going to bring them right back to Iraq. Now, I don't know if I happened to see a blur, but I'd be curious, general, if the Army is tracking how often that's going to happen as a percentage of the total force, because again I could imagine I guess the toughest places for a soldier to be would be, not necessarily in the correct order: Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq. And I'd be curious if the Army is tracking just how often these same soldiers are asked to do these back to back.

The second thing I wish you would touch on — General Sanchez and I had a brief conversation at which time he said off the top of his head he thought that more than half the casualties were being caused by IEDs, improvised explosive devices. Again, off the top of his head — he has not had a chance to get back to me in writing. I have noticed and tracked my fellow Mississippians who have been seriously wounded and killed, and almost every one of them was because of IEDs. I'm concerned that we are making as a nation — and I use the word "we" — the same mistake with taking steps to prevent attacks by IEDs as we made with the body armor, that we did not fully recognize the threat to every soldier, that we have the resources to address it — not in every instance, but in a heck of a lot of instances — and that we are not devoting the resources.

Now, the administration is going to come back and say, Well, that's a classified number. Sir, with all due respect to folks who have said that to me, the Iraqis have figured out if they hit that detonator enough times — maybe it's only going to work nine out of 10 times, maybe it's only going to work eight out of 10 times, maybe it's only going to work seven out of 10 times. But they've figured out that more often than not, because of the lack of resources, they are going to hit that detonator and they're going to kill or maim an American. What are we doing with the units that are rotating in to provide a greater level of protection for them? And, quite frankly, general, it's the protection I got when I went to Iraq, it's the protection the secretary of Defense got when he went to Iraq. Doggone it, I'm told that some of these units are down to \$10,000 to protect a vehicle — which is chump change when it comes to the lives of young Americans. What are we going to do to see to it that the units that are rotating in are going to have a higher level of protection than the units that are there now?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Sir, a great question, and I share your concern on it. Let me answer your first question, which had to do with are we tracking people that are being — going back-to-back deployments. We absolutely are. And this is what's so imperative about us changing from an individual replacement system to one of unit cohesion and stability, where we rotate units, not individuals. And this is also the point at which we achieve great personnel savings within that by stabilizing it. I mean, you're exactly right: somebody could be coming out of Iraq, and be restationed in Korea for a tour over there; or coming from Korea and being sent to a unit that is going to deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan. And we are tacking that. But this is precisely why we must stabilize this force.

REP. TAYLOR: Could you get that number for me?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Yes, sir. Okay, I will.

The second point is one which we all share your concern. A year ago less than 15 percent — I think the number is like 12 percent of the force in the theater over there had the improved body armor. And as I've testified to, and as I've said publicly in the press, and so has the acting secretary of the Army, today we have 100 percent of the people that are deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, and now Kuwait, that have the improved body armor. That meant we had to go from a single provider of this to six vendors I believe we now have, and we are maximizing the capacity to produce this level of protection. And I'd be glad to talk to you about what that level of protection is in closed session.

Likewise on the up-armored humvees, as an example, a year ago we had very few over there. Today we have approaching 2,000, and we are moving towards over 4,000. They've increased the requirement over there to over 4,000 in theater.

REP. TAYLOR: But if I may, general, isn't the total number of vehicles in the 17,000 range?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Yes, sir. We are not going to be able to up-armor every vehicle that is over there. But the humvees that we are using for patrols — and I'm talking about now building up-armored humvees — now, in addition —

REP. TAYLOR: If I may —

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Yes, sir?

REP. TAYLOR: I would hope you would address the jamming devices for the IEDs, without getting too technical, because that is what I think we desperately need. The technology is there. And, again, half the casualties, according to General Sanchez, every Mississippian that I've tracked has been a victim of that.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Certainly. Let me finish these on these up-armored, because there's a big difference between building up-armored humvees from scratch, which we're doing — we've increased production from 80 a month to 220 a month. But we are also producing armored kits that provide armored doors, armored panels — by the way, we're also meeting the Marine Corps' requirement as they're going in there. That's part of the reason it's gone up to 4,000 vehicles.

But we are on track right now to increase the number of up-armored Humvees across the Army to 7,000. We've moved over \$4 billion this year inside of our program to provide not only this level of protection but other initiatives to improve the equipping of the soldier. So that's big.

We also have a local initiative taking place over there, and I think you've been over there and you've seen some of the local initiatives. Our concern there is, is there some of the local initiative we need to test to make sure that they're, in fact, not increasing their vulnerability by putting soft armor on that then becomes part of the projectile?

And so we have teams over there that are working to ensure that the quality of that local work is such that it, in fact, is given a level of protection that we desire on this. So we are doing that in all stops.

I would like to talk to you about the IED initiatives we have. I think it would be better to do that in closed session than in open session. But we have taken some major moves there that are paying off, in my view, right now.

REP. TAYLOR: General — and again, I understand the concern — I don't quite understand. I really fear that the reason that the number is classified is not so that the Iraqi insurgents don't know; it's that the American people don't know, in all fairness. The Iraqis have figured out that if they hit that detonator enough times, they're going to kill a vehicle that does not have a jammer.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Which number are you concerned is classified? I'm not quite sure I'm —

REP. TAYLOR: The percentage of vehicles that have some form of an electronic jammer. It is minuscule. And I know it, you know it, and the Iraqi insurgents know it. And for \$10,000, again, per vehicle — I'm told that they're testing something right now — that is absolute chump change when it comes to keeping a young man from being —

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: I would be glad to get you the figures on what we've got in that regard, but I don't think it's appropriate here to discuss it.

REP. TAYLOR: I understand.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: I also think that you understand that every vehicle doesn't have to be equipped. You have to have groups of vehicles that have that kind of capability under an umbrella. And so I think that's best left to —

REP. TAYLOR: I would very much welcome the opportunity to discuss that with you.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Thank you, Mr. Taylor.

REP. SAXTON: The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Hayes.

REP. ROBIN HAYES (R-NC): Thank you, sir. And gentlemen, thank you for being here today and for the men and women that are doing such a magnificent job under your command.

General Schoomaker, just comment briefly, if you would, on how you're working the big Army in SOCOM to create the proper synergy, if that's the right word, as force structure and transformation occurs, the coordination between SOF and big Army.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Sure. From every — as you know, I commanded Special Operations Command before retiring in 2000. I was the commander-in-chief of U.S. Special Operations Command.

The current commander, General Doug Brown, and I have had a long relationship, going back to the Iran rescue mission, when we were both junior officers together on that mission.

I would tell you that I have never seen better integration of Special Operations and conventional forces than I've seen today. And that is a recurring theme that we're getting from the field. And I think if you take a look at some of the most high-profile operations that have taken place over there, that it would bear that out.

We are — part of our restructuring is providing significantly increased capacity to SOCOM of Army forces in the numbers of special forces, civil affairs, psychological operations, special operations, aviation. That's all part of our restructuring. Those are already taking place and they're already reaping the benefits of that movement, going back to Congressman McHugh's point in terms of what kind of progress we're making.

So, I mean, I am very optimistic and very encouraged. And I think that, you know, over my long career in Special Operations, I have never seen this level of integration and synergy being achieved between those components than I have today.

And this includes across the whole force — the Marine Corps, the Air Force, the Navy. As you know, U.S. SOCOM is a joint command and a very, very capable joint command that is operating across the joint force in a way that I believe was envisioned by many of us that were involved in the transformation of that capability from the dark old days, post-Vietnam.

REP. HAYES: I would agree with your observation. Then, lest we give all the credit to General Brown (sp) and General Kinsinger (sp), when you answer my second question, talk a little bit more about why we are — and I agree — being so successful.

The second question is, what changes are we advocating within the Army to better work with SOF forces? And are we adapting new organizational models to complement lighter, more mobile, more agile, transformed Army?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Yes, sir, we are. This past week I was at both the Joint National Training Center, the new National Training Center construct that we've got with the Marine Corps. The Army, SOF, the Air Force out of Nellis are all coming together in live, virtual and constructive war-gaming.

We built — if you go out to the National Training Center today and take a look at the six to eight Iraqi and Afghan villages that we've built out there, the hundreds of civilians on the battlefield, the insurgents that are on the battlefield, the conventional capabilities on the battlefield, and look at the joint work that's being done across the services and SOCOM, with the units right now — the Third Infantry Division third brigade is out there going through this — it will water your eyes.

I talked to a young company commander that was involved in an operation out there last week that had just returned from Iraq, and I asked him what he thought. And he said, "This brings back some really bad memories on what's going." He said, "This is demanding. It's exactly the kind of thing we need to be doing."

If you go to the JRTC down at Fort Polk and take a look at what now is on the battlefield there, we have over 600 Arab speakers, both contract and uniformed, that we now have on that battlefield that are creating precisely the kind of operational environment that we're facing.

You know, we've gone from kind of 12th grade work to master's degree on the path towards Ph.D. level work in terms of both joint integration and bringing the current battlefield construct, strategic kind of construct, to our training base. So I think we're exactly on the kind of path that we need to be on, and it's borne out by — and, by the way, the unit that's going through the Fort Polk right now and that environment is the 30th —

REP. HAYES: Old Hickory.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Sir? Old Hickory. That's exactly right. And I spent some time with them last week down there. I followed them all the way through their training, from the mobilization at Fort Bragg and Fort Drum and all that all the way through this. And I think that they give it very high marks in terms of how they're being prepared and equipped to go and do what they're going to do.

But those three National Guard brigades are getting the best training we've ever given anybody, and they are getting the best equipment we've ever put on soldiers — over \$3,000 a soldier — in the very newest equipment, body armor and all the rest of it. So I think we're putting our money where our mouth is, and that's part of that \$4 billion we've programmed

within our resources this year.

REP. HAYES: Thank you, sir. I've been to the NTC and look forward to Polk and was there with Old Hickory and appreciate all of you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you, Mr. Hayes. Mr. Schneider.

REP. SCHNEIDER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to ask General Schoomaker just a couple of practical questions in terms of bringing in a unit and replacing, swapping out a unit, and you're going to have an overlap period.

Just in terms of housing, how do you respond to that challenge? I assume we're not going to double up in bunks for a week or two or three. How do you handle the housing needs as you have two units in the same geographic location?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Well, I wasn't here for the J-3's piece of this as he laid it down, so I don't know how much he's explained. The specifics we probably ought to do in closed session.

But you know there are some changes that are taking place in the way boundaries are laid and where units are going and all of that. And right now that is not an issue, to the best of my knowledge. That is something I've asked about. I've been assured by General Sanchez and the others over there that we got that.

As you know — take the Old Hickory — they've had already three or four reconnaissance trips in there with their leadership looking and organizing and coordinating with the units they're replacing, looking at the terrain that they're going to take over and integrating that construct. And that's all part of what they're doing. And nothing has been brought to my attention right now that's problematic in that regard.

REP. SCHNEIDER: Thank you. I wanted to ask, too, with regard to equipment. And you talked in some detail to Mr. Taylor's question about the up-armored Humvees and the number that are there and the number that are coming in.

At what point do a number there have to be brought back because they're either worn out or they need major overhaul? What's the status of that? What's the life expectancy of an up-armored Humvee in Iraq these days?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Well, not unlike any other. But we're bringing none of those back. Everything's staying that we've invested over there. We're bringing no up-armored vehicles back from theater.

REP. SCHNEIDER: So they will be able to be maintained and overhauled there (to your ?) satisfaction?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Yes, sir. And we have — we have — Army Materiel Command has put forward depot-level contact teams forward. We're doing maintenance and refurbishment in the field, just like we are in the pre-position set over there.

As you know, the Third Infantry Division, when it went in on the initial war phase, fell in on pre-positioned equipment, over 9,000 pieces of that equipment. That is being reset, refurbished in theater. But there are no up-armored Humvees, no body armor or anything else like that is coming out of theater. It's remaining. It'll be passed on to units that are coming in.

REP. SCHNEIDER: Thank you.

General Hagee, in your opening statement you talked in some detail about experience with small wars and contacts with LAPD and looking at how to work in communities and neighborhoods in a different way. And there were some press reports that I think tried to perhaps draw more of a distinction between that approach and what has been done in Iraq so far that maybe isn't reality, but I'm sure you saw those articles too.

But the kind of things you're drawing on — the years of experience in the past, the Marine Corps knowledge of small wars, contacts with LAPD — that's been information that's been out there for years. Is this part of this discussion that's been going on about — could we have approached this differently from the very beginning after Baghdad fell? Is that part of that discussion? We perhaps could have done better with a different approach from the get-go?

GEN. HAGEE: In my opinion, no, sir. I believe that the forces that are over there — when they started the current operation several months ago, the battlefield was different at that time than it is today. They have done a tremendous job preparing that particular battlefield. And it has changed.

And we, as I mentioned in my opening statement, we have worked very closely with the Army units that are over

there so that we truly understand how that battlefield has changed. In fact, the scenarios that we are using to train our forces are the same scenarios that the Army forces over there recommended that we use. So all of us are changing as the situation on the ground changes in trying to respond to that situation on the ground.

Now, in the past, no surprise, especially over the last 18 months, we have spent a lot of time on major combat operations. And we have not forgotten how to do that. But what we want to do now is focus on and refresh some of those capabilities that we have to have during a different type of operation that we're facing there on the ground now.

REP. SCHNEIDER: Thank you. My last question. General Schoomaker, I think it was an NPR story I heard a couple of weeks ago that was talking about that there are close to or over 10,000 medical evacuations of Iraq of either wounded or injured or some kind of medical condition.

As you're planning for bringing back substantial numbers of people simultaneously back to the States, is the system prepared for the kinds of medical evaluations and screenings to handle those kinds of numbers?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Sure. This is a real success story in the way that medical care has been brought to soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines on this battlefield, and civilians, by the way. We've had extraordinary success because of the improvements and because of the organizations and everything that we've got there.

I think you know — and I don't want to get into the exact figures, but I think you know that not everybody that's wounded, injured or falls ill is a result of enemy action.

REP. SCHNEIDER: Right.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: And there are some historical trends that are consistent with what we're seeing right now. But I will tell you that every soldier — and this is one of the lessons learned from the first Gulf War — every soldier that comes back out of theater goes through a thorough medical examination that is now documented in the data base and tracked, regardless of whether it's a combat wound or non-combat injury or whether it's an illness.

REP. SCHNEIDER: And you're confident that the system will be able to handle the increased numbers that will all be coming back at the same time?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Sir, we have mobilized our mobilization and demobilization stations in a way that is handling this adequately now, and I see — we've really gone to school on this. I think we're going to do very well. Thank you.

REP. SCHNEIDER: Thank you, General.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you, Dr. Schneider. Thank you. Mr. Simmons.

REP. SIMMONS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To General Hagee, earlier you made the remark about congressional support of our troops in the field. I believe I see from your ribbons, General, that you're a Vietnam vet. And I would say that one of the saddest parts of that war — and I served in Vietnam myself — was that the troops in the field did not feel that we had support.

And I certainly commit myself, as I'm sure most members of this committee do, to providing that support to our troops in the field. And that leads me to my question for General Schoomaker; a couple of questions.

I had the privilege of going to Iraq last October on a code from this committee. I met with four different Guard and Reserve units. And one of the issues that came up repeatedly was the fact that guard and reserve units, many of them MP units or doing MP or security assignments, do not have up-armored Humvees.

And so I wrote to the secretary of the Army, and he wrote me back in November saying that "The movement of these vehicles into the Central Command area of operations has been a top priority" — top priority.

I think we know from previous comments that there continue to be numerous Guard and Reserve units that do not have up-armored Humvees, and the adapter kits that are being produced by Rock Island Arsenal and other commercial vendors are simply not getting over there fast enough.

And when I look at the testimony, General, your testimony on page four, where we read that 18 Reserve component field artillery batteries are going to be converted to MP MOS's, my guess is that they don't have up-armored Humvees because their traditional mission probably didn't require it. And yet they're going to be out there, operating on what is essentially a country without a front line.

So these vehicles, these non-up-armored Humvees, some of which have eisenglass windows and canvas doors, to which I could take this pen and jam it through the door, doors that are no more secure than the doors on my C-J7 Jeep, these units are converting to a task where they're going to be running essentially combat operations through IED ambushes, and so on and so forth, in vehicles that simply aren't up to standard.

I have been in touch with commercial vendors who have kits available. Some are slap-on kits with various types of plastic material. I've been in touch with Rock Island Arsenal on their doors, which can be converted in about two hours. And one of those doors actually saved the life of a Connecticut guardsman. The door was put on the day before they got caught in an IED ambush; saved his life. The family called me and were crying on the phone.

So, you know, this to me is a top priority. But I'm not satisfied. I hear that some of the kits are being shipped over by ship, not air. I think that's inadequate. Some of the vendors say they're not operating at full capacity; they're waiting for more orders. And it just seems to me that this is such an obvious thing for us to focus on.

And so — and I'd also like to say that it's a real morale-buster for the Guard and the Reserve, because many of them, you know, get put into an active component command. Their equipment is inadequate because in the Guard and the Reserve you don't get the up-armor. And yet they're over there, operating, doing the same things, going out on the same streets, securing the same areas. And when they get caught in an IED, they get wounded and killed. And the active component folks are adequately protected.

So I would like to hear what you personally are doing to implement what the secretary of the Army told me, the acting secretary told me was a top priority, so that we can get these kits out to our men and women in the field and make sure that these converting Reserve units are fully and completely equipped before they go over.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Sir, I think you know, I co-signed this with the acting secretary. He and I are very close on this. It, in fact, is our highest priority. If you know of anybody that we haven't talked to, we will take that and we will talk to them and we'll do everything we can to make sure that we're using the full capacity of this nation to protect our people.

I do differ with you, however, in that the Reserve component isn't the only component that did not have up-armored Humvees. The active component did. You know, there were really — a year ago, up-armored Humvees were limited to very few units, active or reserve.

And the distribution of up-armored Humvees in theater has nothing to do with whether it's active or reserve component. It's got to do with where the commander considers his priorities of protection to be. And there are lots of MP units that have to do with detention, for instance; have to do with other kinds of things that they don't patrol that obviously — some of these 149 units I'm talking about obviously are not all going to be over there at one time. And many of them are not going to have patrol functions that require that level of protection. They have other jobs, other military police jobs.

So I guess — you know, I guess to just kind of tie it all together, if you know something we don't know and there's something we can do, I'll take that and we will act on it. The distribution of what's available over there, which is an increasing inventory — I said that we had very few of them over there initially. We now are approaching 2,000 in just four months, I mean, you know. And we, at the same time, are putting add-on kits onto all kinds of vehicles — Hemets, Humvees, every kind of vehicle that you can imagine, to include the local fabrication of things over there.

I think that we pulled all the stops out. If there's something we've missed, we'll address it.

REP. SIMMONS: General, if I could — Mr. Chairman, I plan to visit some of these factories in the next couple of weeks. I look forward to going back to Iraq in a month or so. I think we can speed the process up. I think it's a no-brainer. I think up-armored Humvees save lives.

I don't want to go to the funeral of one of my constituents who is caught in an ambush in a non-up-armored Humvee and tell those parents that I did everything that I could and the country did everything that it could when, in fact, a little bit of glass and hardened steel could have saved that soldier's life.

And we have — the Connecticut Army Guard has no up-armored Humvees for all of its units. It's got five units over in Iraq, some rotating back this spring. But they don't have any. So when they deploy, they don't deploy with any of that stuff.

And I'm sure that that's true of other Guard and Reserve units, and especially those that are taking on MP tasks are out there every day, all the time. And this is a low-cost thing to do and I think it's a no-brainer.

So I will be happy to join with your staff on these visits to these companies and arsenals to make sure that they're into

max production to get these kits over there, because they do save lives. And I take it very seriously, as I'm sure you do.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: I share your concerns in every regard.

REP. SIMMONS: I thank you for your comments. And Mr. Chairman, I'd like to submit some questions on the record for that.

REP. SAXTON: Without objection. Thank you very much, Mr. Simmons.

REP. SIMMONS: Thank you.

REP. SAXTON: Ms. Tauscher.

REP. ELLEN TAUSCHER (D-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, thank you for being here. I think many of us have been committed to transformation for a very long time, and I think that clearly the spontaneous utterances by others in the military over the last few weeks about the end-strength needs have led to frustration by many of us who for a long time have tried to work with the Pentagon to get a sense of reality for what we now know is a very labor-intensive environment, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I believe our military is overstretched. I'm deeply concerned about the stop-loss orders, which I consider to be masking serious retention problems, leading to potentially very serious morale problems.

I have introduced legislation to temporarily increase the military by 8 percent across the board, specifically the Army, the Air Force and the Marines. I stress the term "temporary" because I'm not interested, nor is anybody, in bulging out a military that is not going to deliver us in the short term what we need or the mid term what we need and then cause us problems in the long term.

But let's be really honest what this is about. This is about priorities. We have appropriated, on an emergency basis, \$166 billion. And we're sitting here, ladies and gentlemen, hearing about not having up-armored Humvees, not having the right kind of Kevlar vests. And the truth is, we know we don't have enough troops to do all the things we have to do at once.

My favorite show growing up was "The Ed Sullivan Show." My favorite people on that show were the plate-spinners. Remember the plate-spinners? They started spinning plates. And by the time they got over to number seven or eight, number one started going wobbly on us.

Well we can't go wobbly. We need to know that we have a temporary ability to increase the size of our end strength, do more of the things we need to do, including transform.

But what I'm deeply concerned about is that we have a Pentagon civilian leadership that is more interested in getting what they wanted for a long time, which is transformation, then making sure that we have the right amount of troops, and also making sure that they get all the toys that they've wanted for a long time.

We could reprogram this budget tomorrow, ladies and gentlemen, and have a temporary increase in the end strength and maybe slow down national missile defense for an hour and a half and not have to worry about the money. We know what the problem is. The problem is the money.

Now, General Hagee and General Schoomaker, if I was able to deliver you both the money and the troops, it would be a lot easier, wouldn't it, to do all the things we've got to do? The answer has to be yes, doesn't it?

So if it's about the money, what we need to do on this committee, I believe, is to make a decision to really get the civilian masters in the Pentagon to face the facts. We cannot put the strain on our military and on our American people just because we insist ideologically to keep the budget the way it is and to keep our investments going on things like national missile defense and other things that should not and cannot be a priority right now.

So let me ask you, General Schoomaker and General Hagee, if the money came along and you had a temporary increase in the troops, would it make it easier for you and would it make it better for you in the short term?

GEN. HAGEE: Congresswoman, I'm not sure that one can answer that question with a very succinct statement, either yes or no. It's not really about end strength. It's about the capabilities that the force has. It would take some time, if we received an end-strength increase and if the money came, to stand up those capabilities.

And my sense is that three or four years from now that the situation is not going to be the same as now. So we get an 8 percent, which is a significant increase for the Marine Corps, a significant increase for the Marine Corps.

And so, four years from now, we would have 8 percent — I'm an infantryman, so I'm a little slow on the numbers — but it's several thousand individuals out there that we would have recruited, trained, equipped, found housing for, with some indication that there is a career for you here. And so, four or five years from now, we have those brigades and divisions ready to go.

Do we need them at that time? My sense is right now, ma'am, that we do not. And so my sense is that, at least from the Marine Corps standpoint — and really, I think when you talk about, Does the Marine Corps need an end strength? Does the Army need an end strength increase? we really need to look at it from a joint standpoint, and that's what we have been doing in Iraq, and not looking at it from a service standpoint.

But as the commandant of the Marine Corps, my sense is right now we do not need an end strength increase, that we can do what we need to do, at least over this next year — and this is something we have to watch — there is no doubt about that — and we have to watch all of the indicators to ensure that we are not breaking this unbelievable magnificent force that we have right now. But my sense is that we do not.

A couple of numbers that support that. For FY '04 — we are three months, almost four months, into FY '04 — our recruiting is over 100 percent. Our retention on the regular side and the Reserve side — on the Reserve side it's over 100 percent. On the regular side we have achieved, during the first three months of this fiscal year, 75 percent of what we need for the entire year. That's how the young Marines out there are voting. Could that change? Absolutely. And we want to watch that. But what I do not want to do is mortgage the future for a situation that we have right now that I believe that we can handle with the capabilities that we have in the Marine Corps.

REP. TAUSCHER: General Schoomaker, what is the difference between what the secretary we now understand is going to do, which is an emergency order to basically lift the end strength numbers specifically for the Army by 30,000 — what is the difference between what he is going to do and what we have suggested that he do?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Well, first of all, he's doing what I asked him to do. This is the plan I gave him, and he's approved it. And it's my best judgment that — you know, this isn't a one-dimensional game here. This is a rubric's cube. We've got to do all of the things we have on our plate all the time. And I tried to explain earlier that I think we need to take advantage of both the momentum and the level of resourcing we currently have under this emergency condition to do not only our operational tasks, but to do the kinds of transformational things internally that we need to. We must achieve the kinds of efficiencies and effectiveness within the force. Right now, especially in the Reserve component, we are severely overstructured — too much structure for the level of authorization. And that structure is inappropriate for not only the current operational environment we are in but the future operational environment. And so we must do these things concurrently, which is bring that structure down, form that structure correctly, make that structure correctly across the active and Reserve components — properly train and equip and man, and then stabilize this force so it can.

The fallacy in end strength is that pouring more money and people in that single dimension on top of this current construct is like pouring a canteen of water in the sand: it will not achieve the end that we want. What we must do is have a sound structure with some integrity, and that's appropriate and relevant to what we're doing. And that's why I chose the plan I did. We — you know, I've got a lane. I do not have an ideology. I've looked at this, I've used my judgment. I've come up with what I consider to be the most prudent plan for the nation and for the circumstances that we're in. And I'll tell you I think it's a unique opportunity right now to use these emergency authorities and the emergency funding that we've got to get the head space that we need to do these kinds of things, and then allow ourselves to take a look at what our level of effort is over the next couple of years and be informed. I'm with General Hagee here in that our indicators are we are not only recruiting adequately — I mean, there are more people lining up to come in than we've ever had, and the quality of those people is higher than it's ever been. And there's no indication right now that that's not going to continue. But what I can predict is that if we don't take advantage and transform and develop a broader rotational base of relevant force, so that we can elongate the rotations, and provide some predictability in the force, that we will have a problem if we don't do that. So, you know, this is not just numbers. It is content that is important. And I believe that what we've got here is a very prudent plan for the nation, and one that we can execute now. If you're talking about —

REP. TAUSCHER: General, with all due respect, that doesn't sound any differently than what we have suggested, except it's not being done by the Congress, it's being done by the Pentagon.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Well, wouldn't you expect — I mean, right now when I reach down inside the force, I can't touch all the force, because it's inappropriately designed and not accessible to us. Don't you expect us to be prudent?

REP. TAUSCHER: I do. I just worry whether you're spinning too many players, general.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: And that's what we're trying to do. And then I will tell you — because, see, we can do this faster and we can do it better, and in the long term it's going to be better for the nation. And then if what we have is not a spike and it's not a butte but it's a new plateau, then I think we have a legitimate question about whether or not we need to grow then a force that has integrity to a larger size.

But right now, just dealing in a single dimension is not only wasteful, but it's not going to solve our immediate problem. We have got to do this internal stuff. And I agree with you. There are many cases in the past — there has been, you know, transformational talk that perhaps didn't look very transformational. But I will tell you that it's very difficult — without the kind of focus and emphasis and motion that we've got today — if this force is allowed to come back to rest, as it was previously, it will be impossible again to get the level of transformation that we want.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you —

REP. TAUSCHER: Mr. Chairman, I just want to say one thing. I don't disagree with you. I am wholeheartedly supportive of all the things you are doing. My concern is that the Constitution says the Congress is the one that puts up the military. We need to be fully involved in this. We have I think been moving and trying to get this moved ahead for years, and now all of a sudden it looks like it's going to happen kind of without — not with us certainly in a way that I'm concerned in the end doesn't provide us with the kind of military force that we are going to need in the next three or four years. And we're doing it on the backs of these men and women. We could do it by reprogramming some of the budget and get more people in the short term and have the money there, and certainly have the equipment that we know we need to protect them in this force — in this field of battle. And I just worry about the priorities that the administration is making.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Well, as you know, right now the United States Army has 11,000 more people over end strength.

REP. TAUSCHER: That's the bubble. That's the bubble above —

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: That's part of the bubble and part of what we've got permission to do is to target that growth in a way that makes sense — recruit, train, place, form this force. We can do that. And my view is it's prudent to do it that way.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you, Ms. Tauscher. Thank you very much.

REP. TAUSCHER: I agree.

REP. SAXTON: We're going to go to Mr. Wilson next. But before we do that, general, may I just make an observation probably in the form of a question? It seems to me that the structure that we have now currently in the forces, in the services, and many of the strategies and tactics that we still deploy were developed during the Cold War for a much different type of scenario. We basically were on guard because we had a foe known as the Soviet Union, which had certain capabilities, which fought in a certain way, which we knew all about, and we designed our force and sized our force over time to take care of that perceived threat.

It would go without saying that the threat we face today is different. And therefore isn't what you're saying is that we need to change our force, because we've got a much different threat than the current structure was designed to defend against?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Sir, absolutely. You know, when the wall fell in '92, of course there were indications in '89 that things were changing, but when — but I'm sorry, when the wall came down in '89, it was a big indicator that some things were going to happen. And by '92, with the demise of the former Soviet Union, it changed everything. We've spent the decade since transforming in what people thought would be a strategic pause. And what we now have is a whole new threat and a strategic level that is very, very serious to this nation. And what we have done is we have adapted. and we are moving out to address this threat. But the force structure lags that. It's more difficult to make the physical moves. It's easier to train to and to change your tactics, techniques, and procedures, which we've done. But we need to formalize that and bring the force along to meet the kinds of things that we're adapting. And that's exactly what we're talking about doing. And this in my opinion is not a threat that is going to go away any time soon. I think that we are in a new era, that

we are going to live with a level of threat in this world that is going to cause our armed forces to have to look, think and do things differently than we have in the past. So I agree with you. But it's not simple. It's not linear.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you. Mr. Wilson.

REP. JOE WILSON (R-SC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, generals, thank you so much for being here today. And I've really been looking forward to this hearing for several reasons, because of different perspectives I have. One, in July I concluded 31 years of service in the Army National Guard, and I'm really grateful for the service that I had. And, ironically, I spent about 35 years on premobilization legal counseling, and so I am seeing it all come to fruition. And, indeed, our Guard people and Reserves are very proud to be serving.

Additionally, I am honored to be here as a member of the Armed Services Committee, and in particular I've had the opportunity to travel around the world to visit our troops, and I am constantly reminded of the dedication of our troops and competence of our military leaders and the equipment that you provide. And so I am very, very pleased about that.

But, very important right now is that I'm a proud dad of a son who is at Fort Stewart, and he is being retrained from field artillery into light infantry, and so seeing the extraordinary changes of November the 9th, 1989, we are evolving. And so it's been extraordinary for me to learn from him the movement from MLRS to recovery of ordnance. And I want to congratulate you on that.

And I have another son who will be joining the Signal Corps this summer. So I look forward to him having an Army career.

As I point this out, I want to be reassured one more time, General Schoomaker, you've mentioned that the equipment is being left during the rotation. And because I really believe that the equipment obviously has been tested. The highest quality is right there. But and I share the concerns of Congresswoman Tauscher and Congressman Rob Simmons about the armored humvees, and additionally the flak jackets and body armor. And are we on schedule for persons on patrol to have the proper equipment?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Sir, in my opinion we are. And what I've said I'll stand by. We are not retrograding any of this equipment that we have up-armored and specifically designed and deployed for the purpose of providing that protection. Now, what we are rotating out is standard equipment — tanks, artillery pieces, the things that went over there and fought the war. What we are not rotating is body armor, up-armored humvees, any up-armored kits or any of that kind of stuff.

And I appreciate first of all — I should have started out here I appreciate your service.

REP. JOE WILSON: Thank you.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: You know, my father was in the service for 32 years — World War II, Korea and Vietnam. I've spent a fair amount of time in the service. And I have a 19-year-old daughter, soon to be 20 next month, that did jump school in August and is going to —

REP. JOE WILSON: Congratulations.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: — school this coming summer, and will be commissioned to Army ROTC at the University of Wyoming. So I have a personal investment here.

I surveyed our 307 active duty Army general officers: 92 of them had at least one child that is serving today in uniform — 92. And I'd ask you what other portion of society can claim that level of personal commitment to that? So we take this personally. I mean, this is not something that is being taken lightly or frivolously. And I'd just like to throw that in, because I think that we share your commitment.

REP. JOE WILSON: In fact, I've defended our general staff, and that persons have indicated how could they not provide the equipment. I said, Actually there's no question they are — because it's their family members at risk, and whether by adoption or by actual birth. And so you adopt these young people and want the best for them.

Another question I have is that I was grateful to serve on a delegation led by Congressman Skelton, and we visited Iraq. And of all the things that impressed me was the one-on-one relationship of our troops being established to establish human intelligence. I had envisioned that the patrols were in speeding humvees, but they are not. These young people are walking the streets. They get to know the local citizens. They establish a good relationship. And then, as we have seen over and over again, this has provided the human intelligence to protect our other troops.

But in a rotation, what's being done to maintain this human relationship?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Well, you're hitting on a very important point, and that's precisely the kind of — you know, this transition of authority, as units rotate in there, isn't kind of like a solid line. It's phased in, and there's a hand-off of all of these contacts. Their right-hand seat rights, which are counterparts — most of these transitions take place over a period of weeks in this thing, and we are very, very sensitive to the fact that the great progress we've made has an awful lot to do with the understanding that relationships have been established at the local levels, and the integration of all kinds of interagency capabilities into those relationships. So it's an important point, and I'm glad you brought it up.

REP. JOE WILSON: Well, it was really very inspiring to me, and that's where the ranking member, Mr. Skelton, and I found out that 70 to 90 percent of the people in the country were very supportive of the coalition forces.

A final question. Of course is there a concern about recruiting and retention? And from what I have seen, I have had many more people contact me about joining the Guard and the Reserves, about being sent from one unit to the next, so they can be deployed. I haven't had anybody contact me to the reverse. And you indicated that recruiting and retention are doing well. If you have those figures, and if you could provide them by state, I'd be interested.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: We'd be glad to provide you all of that. And I'll also — I'll reinforce what you just said. When I visited Old Hickory down at Fort Polk, one of the conversations we had with a whole group of soldiers was they really would have been disappointed had they not been included in what's going on. I mean, they've served, they've trained, they feel that they're being prepared. And, you know, to the best of my knowledge we have had no problem in people showing for mobilization. This is hugely encouraging, the commitment of these young folks. And, again, I will tell you that the one thing that the nation is blessed with is some very, very brave and committed young people.

REP. JOE WILSON: Right.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you very much, general.

REP. JOE WILSON: And God bless our troops.

REP. SAXTON: We really need to try to keep this — if you guys would — if you folks would keep your eye on those little lights down there, I'd appreciate it, because we need to move — give everybody a chance to ask a question.

Ms. Davis?

REP. SUSAN DAVIS (D-CA): Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. We certainly appreciate your commitment. As I sit here and we talk about the need for equipment, I can imagine how difficult it is for you, because in fact we have sent young people into harm's way without proper equipment, and that's a difficult thing for all of us.

I wonder if we could just go back a little bit to the challenges that we face in terms of the rebalancing of the Reserve and the active component. And I know that we obviously are relying, as you have said in your statements as well, so much greater on the Reserves. And I'm having a little difficulty from your statements and our questions of how we are really lessening the impact on the Reserves by what we are doing and by our actions. And part of it is a concern for equipment, making certain that it's equal among the Reserves and the active forces. And we know we've all heard some stories regarding that. The other is a medical follow-up. My concern is partly in the mental health area, that it's one thing for the active units when they come back, because we can follow them a little easier. It's harder to follow a number of our Reserve units that go back, and you know they are really dispersed really in communities, and may not have some of those follow-up services. So could you help me out a little with that? What are we doing?

And then, finally, I just appreciate the concerns of my colleagues as well. I think that we were not as geared for civil defense as we needed to be. I appreciate your discussion in terms of the simulation exercises that we have been having. But, once again, can you give me a better sense of comfort that we have really made great leaps in terms of our ability to deal culturally in the country and save our lives as well in that regard? Thank you.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: I would — the medical piece of your question, I'll reemphasize: 100 percent of the people returning, especially the Reserve components — now, the active force of course is coming back home and staying at Fort Stewart or Fort Bragg or Fort Campbell, wherever they came from, and we have different handle on that.

The Reserve component people that we are demobilizing are being documented through the medical detachments at their demobilization station. That's part of their out-processing. They are being treated, tracked, where the data is being collected from them — where they were, what kinds of — being compared against their mobilization medical evaluation.

And that's all going into a database so that we can retain this. The VA is working with us on this at these places. So I am very, very confident that we have learned from our experience from the first Gulf War, and that we are addressing the kinds of issues that arose out of that. I think we are doing very well in that regard, and I'm encouraged as I go around.

In fact, as you visit these installations, one of the places that you might want to visit is places where we are demobilizing soldiers, and look at how that takes place. It's a very formal process, very well documented. And I'm very confident it's going to do what you want.

Now, on the other question, and that is I can't talk to the broader homeland security interagency piece — I'll stay in my lane on this — but one of the most useful components to homeland defense and security are Reserve components, and especially the National Guard and the Army Reserve. And that's because they're distributed throughout the communities, and the National Guard in particular operates under Title 32, which is a non-federal status for the adjutant generals and the governors of their states. And part of our restructuring of the Reserve component is not only to take part of that Reserve component and make it more relevant to what we need on the active side to plug in with active forces, but also things that are more relevant to homeland security, like transportation, engineer, signal, MPs, infantry and these kinds of things that would be useful in times of emergency here at home.

And, by the way, those very same capabilities are very useful to us when we get into stability and support operations, like we are in right now in contingency operations. So my view is, you know, one of the biggest benefits we are going to get out of Reserve component restructuring is not only reinforcing the active force, but improving what their contribution can be to their —

REP. SUSAN DAVIS: I certainly can appreciate that, sir, because in San Diego of course we've realized how important it was to have more fire-fighting capability for wild fires actually in the National Guard. And we hope to —

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: It's hard to fight wild fires with artillery, tanks and attack helicopters.

GEN. SCHWARTZ (?): Although, Mr. Chairman, may I just mention that that was a mix of forces, ma'am, both active duty and Reserve.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you very much, Ms. Davis.

REP. SUSAN DAVIS: Thank you. And if I may, Mr. Chairman, I think one of the things that is obvious in terms of the questions that have come today is when we think of equality as well among the services is having the officers from the Reserve components available at the same time would also be helpful.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you very much.

REP. SUSAN DAVIS: Thank you.

REP. SAXTON: We are going to go to Ms. Wilson next, but Mr. Skelton has a quick question he would like to get in.

REP. SKELTON: Yes, I — from what I have seen in the planning, in the caliber of people in uniform, I think you are probably going to have a first-class rotation, and I compliment you ahead of time, but I'm just — from what I see I think it will go well, and I — but I have a tougher observation or question for each of you, and it is very short — and I know you've thought about this. So in your opinion, how many more rotations like this will we have? This is not a one-time operation. General? General Hagee?

MR. SCHWARTZ (?): Sir, let me start with that. We are looking at, as we speak —

REP. SKELTON: Where'd you come from?

MR. SCHWARTZ (?): I'm sorry, sir, forgive me.

REP. SKELTON: Let me ask then and then you can chime in. General Hagee?

GEN. HAGEE: Sir —

REP. SKELTON: Because their services are the two that are —

GEN. HAGEE: Yes, sir.

REP. SKELTON: Go ahead.

GEN. HAGEE: We don't know. I do not know how many rotations we'll have. Probably more importantly, I don't know what the size of those rotations are going to be. There is no surprise that we plan for a large rotation, which is worst case and a —

REP. SKELTON: But you have given it thought, I hope?

GEN. HAGEE: We most certainly have given it thought, yes, sir.

REP. SKELTON: General Schoomaker?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Sir, I've given instructions to the Army that we should plan. This is not a prediction, but it is a planning factor. I've said I want to plan rotation three and rotation four to be sized like rotation for planning purposes.

REP. SKELTON: Thank you. Thank you very much, sir.

REP. SAXTON: Ms. Wilson.

REP. HEATHER WILSON (R-NM): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I also wanted to thank those of you who are serving, and the people that you represent, for all that you are doing for this country.

I also want to say that I think we may have had a breakthrough here this morning. I think this is the first time we've had someone from the Defense Department come up and actually say that we are going to need to increase the size of the Army. The question is how, for how long, and which positions and so on. And I wanted to let you know that I'm really grateful for that, because there have been a lot of us here on this committee — Mr. Cooper and myself, Mr. Skelton, Mr. Hunter — and in fact the large bipartisan majority of this committee are very concerned that the Army is overstretched, and that we needed to get beyond the talking points and into the budgets, the plans, the timelines, the training, the things that are required to not only improve the capability of the Army to meet the threats of the 21st century, but to make sure that we have enough forces to do the job.

I look forward — and I know that you know, General, I have asked for a rather detailed briefing on this plan and on retention issues and recruitment issues, because I think — and Mr. Cooper and I have also sent not only a letter to the secretary of Defense but to the president saying this is an issue we must address in FY '05.

There's no more putting this off. We have to figure out what we're going to do and how we're going to do it and put the money there to make that happen. And I look forward to working with you and with the Army and the Defense Department on figuring out what are the scope and details of that plan and asking tough questions about it, too, to make we get this right, and also to know what are the risks that we're taking. Any plan has risks associated with it. And I think we need to understand those risks and what the trade-offs are that you're recommending.

I would ask you to comment on two things. One is the issue of what units are in the reserve and guard and what units are on active duty. I wonder if you could elaborate a little more for us. I know there's — you call them buttes. We call them mesas in New Mexico and spikes and all kinds of other plateaus people are talking about.

But all of us accept that there's a very high rate of mobilization at the moment associated with Iraq. But if you look even pre-Iraq, the rate of mobilization of guard and reserve forces has been much higher since September 11th. And that is, for all of us, a concern about what continues in the out years, particularly for folks who are in reserve and guard units associated with security, civil affairs and so forth.

What are you planning to do with those kinds of capabilities? And are you looking at bringing more of those onto active duty?

GEN. HAGEE: Do you want to talk about your —

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Well, I can talk from the Army perspective, and I know General Hagee has done some things in particular with his ANGLICO. He's bringing more ANGLICO capability to his active side.

What we are doing on the Army, the restructuring of the force is a total Army force — active, guard, reserve. You're exactly right. We are using reserve component forces for the purpose that we have them, and that is to mobilize and support in times of emergency the active force.

And I think there are two strategic questions that we really are going to have to answer in the coming years. One of them is, what is the proper volunteer force and how do you incentivize that force for the future?

In the current operating environment, if it's indicative of what we're going to face in the future and the level of effort that's required, what kind of volunteer force do we need on active duty?

The second question is, is the current active-reserve construct correct? It was designed in a time when we had a draft and we mobilized for war, and we filled these units out and we went to major war.

When your reserve component costs start approaching your active component costs for maintenance — I'm talking about now training, equipment and all the rest of it — it starts to beg the question whether or not there shouldn't be a larger active force. And I think that's a question for the future, in terms of what the availability of the reserve component is going to be and the rest of it.

Now, on the other hand, in our current environment and what I think will be our future environment, there is going to be increased need for National Guard in particular capabilities in the homeland to deal with potential terrorist attacks, to deal with natural disasters, to deal with the kinds of things that we have. And they need to be relevant to the local authorities, because that's where these problems were dealt with initially is at the local level before they've federalized. And that's our system. That's the way it works.

And so, having said that, as I look at restructuring this Army right now, we are moving capability, not people but capability, from the reserve component to the active; for instance, port-opening units, so that we can move much more rapidly in an expeditionary sense to open ports and airfields and sea ports and those kinds of things.

We're moving more civil affairs capability into the active force structure. We're moving more special forces. We're moving more special forces aviation. We're moving more MP structure into the active force structure.

On the reserve side, we're taking down excess combat capability, like excess field artillery capability, air defense capability, some other things, and converting them to more usable force structure that will not only support us in an expeditionary sense but will support us in longer-term campaigns and major war and also be useful in the homeland security arena.

So, again, it's more like a Rubik's Cube. There are things moving sideways, back and forth, up and down. The structure itself is changing so that it can be maintained at a more ready level. And we're looking at what is the availability.

Right now, much of the reserve construct is not reachable because of what it is. And what we need to do is bring more of that into play to relieve the stress, both on the active and the reserve side, as we go into the future. We have over a million people in the Army, active and reserve. Five hundred and fifty-five thousand people comprise the reserve component and 482.4 thousand comprise the active. And we're not touching that million people.

REP. WILSON: Thank you, General. I understand the concept. I think we're at the point where we're going to need to get into some of the details of your plans, programs and budgets. And that's not something maybe we can do here, but I look forward to seeing that. I'm one of those people that doesn't buy a car till I've read all the consumer reports. And we've got to get beyond the talking point.

I sense from your testimony today that you now have a plan. And we're going to need to test that plan from a variety of angles and probably make some revisions to that and some suggestions to that. And I look forward to engaging on that, because I think, frankly, this is going to be the biggest issue in this year's defense authorization bill is how do we make sure the Army stays healthy and is ready for 21st century combat.

I appreciate your time, sir.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you very much, Ms. Wilson. Just to take a little break here and ask you — I know that General Hagee and General Schoomaker, you both have 1:00 appointments back at the Pentagon. So that means you have to leave here at 20 of? Will that be satisfactory?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: That would be fine, sir.

REP. SAXTON: Okay, thank you. Mr. Meehan?

REP. MARTIN MEEHAN (D-MA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Schoomaker, it's obvious that many of us are concerned about the effect of the massive troop rotation in Iraq on the National Guard and the reservists. After the rotation, it's my understanding that 45 percent of the personnel in Iraq will be activated guard and reserve units.

Obviously this places a huge burden on individual members of the guard and the reserves and their families. And it also makes — most of us see it likely that it will affect recruiting and retention.

As I see it, part of the problem is that we have such a large portion of missions related to stabilization and reconstruction operations that are concentrated in the guard and the reserve. For example, the United States needs troops with military police training to maintain order in Iraq, but it only has about 37,000 MPs.

According to the Wall Street Journal, about 12,000 of those MPs are in Iraq. Only about 15,000 MPs are active-duty soldiers. So the rest presumably are reservists and National Guard, many of these people pulled from civilian law enforcement. And the call-up has put obviously a serious strain on police departments.

To use another example, Brigadier General David Blackledge, commander of the 352nd Civil Affairs Command, said in a recent interview that more than 80 percent of the Army's civil affairs forces have been activated during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. And because of this shortage, we're only capable of replacing 70 percent of the 1,600 civil affairs soldiers currently in Iraq.

How do you plan to compensate for the loss of these personnel during this new troop rotation? And I understand the need to make sure that civilians have a stake in any major conflict we ask professional soldiers to undertake. But shouldn't we be taking steps to make sure that the guard and the reserve forces do not have to be such a large portion of the burden of long-term stabilization and reconstruction operations in the future?

And I'm curious as to what you think of the idea of shifting some of the military police, civil affairs, engineering and intelligence capabilities used for stabilization and reconstruction efforts to full-time active-duty force.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Sir, that's exactly what we're doing. The OAF 1, the one that we are terminating now and fixing to rotate out — the figures I've got here are 76 percent active component, 34 percent reserve component. The OAF 2 figures I have here are 63 percent active, 37 percent reserve.

Now, the way Army Reserve is structured, the combat capability in the main about a decade ago was moved on the reserve component side out of the Army Reserve and into the National Guard. And the majority of combat support and combat service support that is not associated with divisional structure was in the Army Reserve.

And it's in the Army Reserve where you find a majority of your civil affairs capability. And one of the areas that I talked to — and again, civil affairs are owned by U.S. SOCOM, and the Army provides structure based upon their requirement, and then they manage and rotate and deploy, and all the rest of that, the civil affairs structure.

But one of the areas in which we are significantly increasing U.S. SOCOM's capability is in the civil affairs area by moving more civil affairs from the reserve component, Army Reserve, to the active side.

In the past, we had 25 battalions of civil affairs, and 24 of those battalions were in the Army Reserve. Today we're moving toward a number where — we're increasing the number. But we're still going to be largely dependent upon reserve component in civil affairs, because that's where the expertise resides to do the kinds of things we do in civil reconstruction. And that's both — you know, that's actually the strength of the system is that we bring that kind of expertise to bear when necessary.

REP. MEEHAN: Thank you, General. I know there has been discussion about — this is a question for General Hagee. I know there's been discussion about adequate body armor protecting our troops. And I apologize; I had to spend an hour — I had a bill in Judiciary, so I've been running back and forth. But I know this was discussed.

It's my understanding that 20 percent of the Humvees currently being used by our guard and reservist units in Iraq have been strengthened to protect against enemy fire or road-side bombs. Now, I know the Army is working hard to up-armor 3,500 additional Humvees and to get them to our soldiers as quickly as possible. But production is expected to take until 2005.

This leaves our soldiers in many instances poorly equipped and poorly protected for nearly two years. As the Marines prepare to deploy to Iraq again, it is my hope that they will take some of the lessons learned from the Army in terms of providing adequate equipment to our troops. And I think there are signs that they're doing that.

I'm encouraged that just last week the Marine Corps signed a contract purchase for \$7 million worth of add-on armor for ground vehicles from Foster-Miller, which is a Massachusetts-based company that I toured recently. And these light-weight, inexpensive kits can be attached in the field within one hour instead of the half-day it takes for the Army to outfit

Humvees with metal armor here.

It's my understanding that the Marine Corps made this decision to purchase these kits after reviewing the Army's test results of Foster-Miller's products, which were, I believe, completed at Aberdeen Proving Grounds.

General, can you elaborate on how and why the military made its decision — the Marines made the decision to purchase this add-on armor? And is it applicable for the other services for ground vehicles?

GEN. HAGEE: First, I would say, Mr. Congressman, that we have worked very closely with the Army, especially those soldiers in units that are over in Iraq right now, as to what is the best protection that we can get. And our decisions have been based upon those discussions.

This is not an easy problem. If I could just talk for a few minutes about that, there is the requirement for personal armor. And, as the Army, we are 100 percent. Every single Marine who goes over there will have the so-called SAPI armor.

Then there is the question of how our vehicles, not just the Humvees but how our other vehicles are protected. For example, one of the things that we're doing with our seven-ton truck is we are taking the seats off of the side of the truck. They come with the seats on the side. We are moving those seats to where the Marines sit back to back in the middle of the truck. We are putting armor up along the side of the truck. The truck was not designed for that. We are doing that.

The Army is leaving behind — as General Schoomaker has said, they are leaving behind — 82nd Airborne is leaving behind some of their up-armored Humvees. We are taking them. They are leaving behind some of the kits that they brought in, and we will continue modifying our Humvees. In those areas where we don't have the kits, we are using expeditionary ways, whether they are ballistic blankets or actually cutting steel.

We are doing everything that we can to ensure that our vehicles and that our Marines and that our soldiers get the best protection that we can give them.

In addition — and I think this is important, because here we have just talked about protecting the vehicles — there are other things that we are doing. We need to integrate, and we are doing this, our technical intelligence and our human intelligence. The congressman talked about what those young soldiers are doing on the ground, interacting with the Iraqis and getting information from them. We will continue doing that.

We are using technological means to locate where these — and I can't go very far in this in open session — but we are using technological means to protect the Marines and soldiers against the IEDs. And we are developing tactics, techniques and procedures. So it's a combination of all of these events — tactics, techniques and procedures. It's human intelligence, technical intelligence and Army, both individualized and our equipment, that will provide the best protection that we can for the men and women who are over there.

I have to tell you, sir, it's still going to be a dangerous place.

REP. SAXTON: General Hagee, thank you very much. Mr. Kline.

GEN. HAGEE: Sir, could I add something to this, to clarify something, because I think your question indicated or kind of would lead one to believe that the Army and the Marine Corps are doing things differently —

REP. MEEHAN: No, not necessarily. The point I was making that the testing the Army had done at Aberdeen I think resulted in the Marines purchasing the area contract for \$7 million worth of these kits. And I guess what I'm getting at is I'm curious whether there will be more of that going on.

GEN. HAGEE: Let me give you a figure here, because our requirement went from 3,500 up-armored humvees to over 4,000 to meet the Marine Corps requirement. And all of those things that have been produced and shipped are staying there. They will get them all. Nothing is going to come back out. I've just got some figures here. We are procuring 6,310 humvee kits, with \$129 million. This will be completed by August of '04. So it's not '05. We've installed over 258 of these in theater now, and we're doing 182 Hemet kits for the bigger trucks, 35 FMTV kits, 19 PLS kits, and others. And I can give you these numbers — I mean, it goes on forever here. But the answer is this is a huge investment, and one that's very aggressive and one that takes the Marine Corps — everybody — Marines, Air Force, Army, everybody that's in theater is benefiting from this effort here. It's a unified effort.

REP. MEEHAN: Yeah, it wasn't my intention to say there wasn't cooperation, sir. I would simply point out that the

Army had done that testing at Aberdeen.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you. Mr. Kline.

REP. JOHN KLINE (R-MN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. Thanks for standing in the trenches for us all. I'm very pleased with the presentation that we got today about the movement of troops out of theater and into theater. I think it's probably a very good plan. I'm not surprised a bit, but nevertheless I find myself delighted again to hear about that we are paying attention to lessons learned, and we've got language immersion going on in the Marine Corps, modifying tactics and procedures to adjust to the new situation. And I trust, General Schoomaker, the Army is also doing some intensive language training.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Sure are.

REP. KLINE: I am very proud of course of my active service in the Marines, and very proud of my son's active service in the Army. He's been in for 10 years, and he too is proud of his service in the Army, in the active-duty forces. But I want to share my concern along with my colleagues about the Guard and the Reserve. And, General Schoomaker, you said that the proper mix of active and Reserve and Guard forces was a question for the future, I think you said. And I think you're sensing that from our perspective it's a question for today.

Looking at the force mix in theater, at the end of the troop rotation — we now have different numbers — I guess it depends on whether you're talking Army, total force or service — but around 40 percent of the force in theater will be from the Reserve and Guard component.

So let me just cut to sort of a straightforward question. If you are successful in your transformation, moving from three brigades to four and so forth in the active Army, and if we complete the movement from artillery units to military police that we see going on in the Reserve component and upgrading if you will some of the Guard components to make them more deployable, what would you guess that mix would be in theater?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: I think it would reflect — well you know, it's hard to tell the future —

REP. KLINE: I understand that, but if you had it in place today in the tactical situation was in Iraq was what it was today, if you had that force mix, what would the active and Reserve component mix be?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: I think there would be clearly heavier weighting on the active component than the Reserve component.

REP. KLINE: Even though you are increasing the number of military police in the Reserve component, and increasing combat brigades in the Guard component? I mean, it sounds to me like your plan, which I am not critical of at all, because we do need to change, is still putting a pretty heavy reliance on being able to call up — to mobilize and activate Guard and Reserve forces. And I'm just wondering if that's —

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: No, I think that there's no backing off the fact that the Reserve components exist to give us surge capability and reinforcing capability in times of emergency. But part of the restructuring of the active side is also to increase the percentage of civil affairs, MPs, transportation, aviation, all the rest of it that right now is in heavy demand. And I think that, as I said, the Rubik's cube includes active, Guard and Reserve in terms of restructuring both within it and across those boundaries in terms of capabilities within the force structure that's —

REP. KLINE: Right, I think I understand. I don't know how to solve a Rubik's cube myself, but I understand the complexity here of what you're talking about. My point is that I hope that at the end of this restructuring plan that you're working on that in the current circumstances, we would not be relying as heavily on the Guard and Reserve, because I am heartened to hear that the retention and recruitment numbers are high in the Marine Corps and in the Army for Guard, Reserve and active forces. But the other side of this, which I think some of us are frustrated here, that we are getting a little bit of a tin ear from the Pentagon, and that is that we have employers who are losing valuable employees to active duty, being called up to active duty. And we have a reliance in our communities for firemen and police and so forth who are no longer there. They have been called up to go over and serve in Iraq. And so this reliance — and I'm afraid that this war on terrorism is going to last awhile — this heavy reliance on the Guard and Reserve is having an impact in our communities, and our businesses in our districts, that I think we need to as a nation, and as a committee here, and as members of the armed forces, we need to put the whole picture in there.

So I am heartened to hear that you think there would be less reliance on the Guard and the Reserve. I hope so. I am

eagerly looking forward to working with all the services, but frankly particularly the Army. General Hagee is getting a little bit of a break here today. It won't always be so, General, but I am looking forward to working with you on that, and I hope we are moving in that direction, and quickly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you very much, Mr. Kline. Mr. Larsen.

REP. RICK LARSEN (D-WA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank you for your patience today. Thank you for your service as well to the country. I've got a lot of questions to ask. I want to be sure that we're exercising our appropriate oversight role in getting things answered.

The first question is for General Schwartz, and this goes back about two hours ago when you were commenting in regards to the Washington State National Guard, who are now in California right now training and getting ready to head out. Did you say that the 81st would be one of those brigades that will be there longer than 12 months?

GEN. SCHWARTZ: No. It is succeeding units, and therefore the contract is up to 12 months boots on the ground for the 81st.

REP. LARSEN: Okay. They'll be happy to hear that. Thanks, I appreciate that.

The second set of questions is for General Hagee and General Schoomaker, and this has to do with the troop rotation, obviously, but the focus is less on our troops and more on Iraqi security forces. One of the assumptions about being able to move from having 130,000 or so U.S. troops on the ground to 105,000 U.S. troops on the ground is having an increased Iraqi security capability. I don't want to simplify this too much, but we're decreasing the U.S. presence by about 25,000 through this troop rotation, and the Iraqi security footprint will be about — right now — in October it was 115,000. It's probably higher than that now. It's certainly higher than that now — not sure of the exact number. But it seems to me that if we're — what kind of confidence can we have in the capability of the Iraqi security forces, made up of police and civil defense and facility protection, and the very few numbers in the Army, where it takes 115,000-plus Iraqi security forces to compensate for a drop in 25,000 U.S. security forces? The question I have directly for you, General Hagee, and General Schoomaker, is your assessment of the capability of the Iraqi security forces, especially in face of a seemingly increasingly sophisticated and stubborn insurgency? Can you provide some comment on that, and provide some comment with regards to your planning on troop rotation — this troop rotation — and any thinking that you have about it in the future?

GEN. HAGEE: Sir, this is probably really outside of our lane. This is something that General Abizaid, who is the combatant commander over there, and General Sanchez, soon to be General Metz (ph), are working on a day-to-day basis, and providing us information back. So really that question needs to go to them, sir.

REP. LARSEN: General Schoomaker?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Well, I agree it's outside of our lane. But we've had visibility of what the plan is and the progress there, and I think there's been substantial progress. You know, what we're trying to do is stand up a sovereign nation. And if you talk to General Abizaid about his concept of going from local control to regional control to more of a strategic oversight, I think he's well on track for that plan. And I don't think you can make a one-to-one relationship. I think it is complex, standing a nation up, and dealing with all the complexities they've got there across all the kinds of demographics and configurations they've got.

But it appears to us, from the briefings that we've received, that we're making significant progress, and I think that we're on track to well over 200,000, is what I recall.

REP. LARSEN: But those are numbers, and I'm talking capabilities. And the concern that I am expressing has to do with the fact that it takes 200,000 — I think 212 — is the total number across the civil defense force and the military and the facilities protection and police. But it will take 200,000 then to replace the 25,000 fewer U.S. troops that we'll have in terms of capabilities. I'm trying to get a feeling of our confidence in the capabilities of the Iraqi security force, because even in November, when this troop rotation was originally planned, it was still conditioned based upon the ability — not just to throw Iraqi bodies into —

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Right, their capability —

REP. LARSEN: — security, but to have the capability for Iraqi security, a capability within the Iraqi security.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Their capability is nascent and increasingly becoming better, and they bring many attributes

that in the long run will be very, very beneficial — certainly because they speak the language, they're local, they understand all of the things there. And I'm encouraged by the fact that we're making the progress we are.

I think it's very, very difficult and incorrect to compare on a one-to-one basis the finest military in the world against —

REP. LARSEN: I think — I'm — Mr. Chairman, if you'll just indulge me — I am absolutely on board with that. There is just no way that we can make a one-to-one relationship between one of our military and one of their security.

The issue I have is that we see an increasingly sophisticated insurgency, and their work continues, and they're targeting Iraqis as much as they're targeting us. And if we're trying to eventually work our way towards Iraqi civilian government, and then work our way out of there at some point, we need to be sure that Iraqi security can fill that gap, so that we don't have a bigger problem later on.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: There's no argument from me on —

REP. SAXTON: We're going to have to move on —

REP. LARSEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you, Mr. Larsen. We're going to have to move on with Dr. Gingrey.

REP. PHIL GINGREY (R-GA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Hagee and General Schoomaker, my question is going to pertain — and I hate to keep taking you back to the issue of the humvees and the improvised explosive devices, but when I was in Iraq with maybe the last CODEL that has been there from this committee, December the 19th through the 23rd, one of the soldiers that I met, talked with, Command Sergeant Major Eric Cook (sp), whose uncle lives in my district, was killed two days later by an improvised explosive device while on patrol in a humvee. And so I'm real concerned about the issue of getting these vehicles up-armored.

And, General Schoomaker, earlier in the testimony you said that in regard to body armor that we have gone now up to I think six vendors who are producing the body armor. And it's my understanding that we only have — and you can certainly correct me if I'm wrong on this — that we currently only have one vendor who actually does it in the factory at \$50,000 per unit. And even though I think you mentioned we're going from 80 a month to 220 a month of those that are armored in the factory, we need many more. And you talked about the kits. My question would be, first of all, are the after-factory kits that we're purchasing and spending a lot of money on to do that, do they give the same protection to those vehicles, those humvees as the ones that are actually armored, up-armored in the factory? And, if they don't, then maybe we should — and why aren't we getting additional vendors to do that work, if we only have one, and we could go to six vendors for the body armor?

My other question is in regard — and I understand this might not be something you can talk about, but maybe you can hint at it — these improvised explosive devices — if there were some way — if there were some way that we could detect them without having a humvee with four soldiers ride by, and as Representative Taylor was talking about earlier, you can't have "cottonwoods" on every patrol and jam the signals from these remote devices that are setting these things off. There has got to be some way that we can find out and seek out and identify these things, so that our bomb squad can come in and detonate them or whatever, inactivate. I'm talking about dogs, I'm talking about bees — I'm talking about some way — and I think, General Hagee, you hinted at this, technological means that you may or may not be able to talk about. But those are my two questions.

GEN. HAGEE: Sir, we have deployed what we call IED task forces into the theater, and further discussion of the particulars I think we ought to have in closed session. But we are making progress, and there are capabilities that are being brought to bear that I believe have demonstrated already significant progress along the lines at what you're talking about. And I think we'll get better and better at it. It's a very adaptive foe, and we have to be able to adapt faster than he can, and that's ultimately what this is about. But I don't think it would be useful in open session to talk about the particulars of it. But we'd be glad to discuss that.

I'm a little confused, because as I listened to your question on body armor and humvees, I think we mix it up. We're making 25,000 sets of body armor a month out of six vendors. We've gone from one vendor to six. We're creating — we're building 25,000 sets of SAPI plates a month.

REP. GINGREY: I'm very pleased with that information. My question is of course can't we transfer that same effort to speeding up the arming of the humvees at the factory level?

GEN. HAGEE: And that's a fair question. The acting secretary is meeting at the CEO level with those folks, and visiting the factory on how this happens, and we're addressing that, taking a look at what the possibilities are here. But it's very interesting how these are built, and I don't want to take the time right now to do it. The issue of whether the add-on kits are as effective as an up-armored humvees — the add-on kits protect only certain portions of the humvee.

Now, one of the things we've made is a decision that all future humvees that we make in the future will have the capability of accepting the additional weight, because we are going to buy the bigger engine, the bigger transmission and the bigger suspension. See, in the past, many of these humvees, you know, were not designed to carry that kind of weight, and that limits our ability to up-armor them. So I think we are taking a pretty comprehensive approach to what the future will hold in this regard.

REP. SAXTON: General and Dr. Gingrey, thank you very much. We've got just about 10 minutes left, and we've got three members yet who haven't had an opportunity to ask their questions. So if we could save a minute here or there, it would be appreciated.

Mr. Cooper.

REP. JIM COOPER (D-TN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm grateful for the service to the nation of each of the panelists. Three quick questions.

Number one, General Hagee, you were quoted by Richard Halloran, a former New York Times correspondent, as saying, quote, "Have we arrived at the point where we are going to have to have forces spread throughout the world — the Sinai, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan? If we are," you apparently concluded, "then I think the answer might be that we do in fact need an end strength increase." This was apparently in a December Washington conference. Is that an accurate quotation?

GEN. HAGEE: Partially. I think I've talked about whether we're at a spike or whether we're at a new plateau. And if we are in fact at a new plateau, then I think we need to look seriously at an end strength increase, because the time it takes to build these divisions three or four years from now we'll have those divisions ready to go. If in fact this is a spike, a year or so, then to go, to spend the money, to spend the resources to build those divisions that in four years in fact we are not going to need, because we're coming back down, I think is the wrong way.

REP. COOPER: The second question. General Schoomaker, apparently there will be an emergency order to increase end strength by some 30,000 troops. How will that be paid for?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: We're not increasing the end strength. We're growing — using the emergency authorities and the current level of funding, to include the supplemental, to do that.

REP. COOPER: To include?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: The supplemental funding that we have —

REP. COOPER: To include the supplemental — the supplemental we've already passed?

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: That's correct. And the fact is that, as I said, because of stop-loss, stop-move and things we've done to stabilize the forces, you know that's not blanket across the whole force, stop-loss, stop-move. But because what we stabilized is in the AOR right now, we've got that bubble. What we want to do is target that growth in a way that facilitates this transformation we're talking about. And of course the sooner we can bring that down, because we find these things to offset it below the line that will work.

But I agree, again, with what General Hagee just said. You know, if this is a new level of stress that's going to be forever or for the future for the long-term, then I think we have a different problem, and that's not what we see right now. But I will go back and say once again that before we grow that force, I want to make sure that it's got a solid foundation, and that we've got it set the way it should be for the future, and that's what we're doing this emergency authority work with.

REP. COOPER: Third question. In a leaked memo this fall, Secretary Rumsfeld said he did not have the proper metrics to determine whether we are winning or losing the war on terrorism. Do you gentlemen have any ideas on the proper metrics so that the secretary can have better measures for determining whether we are winning or losing this war?

GEN. HAGEE: I would suggest that there is no one metric, that there are a whole series of metrics. General

Schoomaker has talked about helping the Iraqis stand up essentially a new society. So we are talking about economics — we're not only talking about security, but we're talking about economics, we're talking about schools opening, we're talking about producing electricity, we're talking about kerosene. So I think there's a whole range of metrics that we need to look at, and in fact we are looking at.

REP. COOPER: Those are not traditional military measures.

GEN. HAGEE: This is not only a military problem, sir. I think it goes across all elements of national power.

REP. COOPER: What are some more traditional military measures that we could be looking at, measures that are within your lane?

GEN. HAGEE: Yes, sir. Security obviously, the number of attacks on our forces, the number of IEDs — those are all metrics that we are in fact looking at and tracking.

REP. COOPER: But the secretary said were apparently insufficient, because he's had access to those for some time.

I see my time is waning, and out of respect to my other colleagues, I defer.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you very much, Mr. Cooper, much appreciated. Mr. Marshall.

REP. JIM MARSHALL (D-GA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm probably going to ask both of you to think a little bit outside your lane as well. But I want to begin by thanking General Schoomaker for the (privilege ?) trip — and I don't think you benefited at all from my counsel. I certainly benefited from yours.

Just a quick observation before I ask my question. Ms. Wilson's approach to this I think is entirely reasonable. There is a sense on this committee that end strength may be low. The fact that there's an emergency order that is going to increase the permitted end strength by some 30,000 suggests that that may be the case. And you gentlemen are both saying that if we are at a plateau then we need to really rethink end strength. But we don't know that we are. And you are quite reasonable in being worried about increasing end strength, and then not being given in the long run the kind of resources you need in order to train to do all the things that you'd like to do to have a really quality Marine Corps and Army.

Our history, this committee's history and the Congress's history, is not good when it comes to this, and we can talk about providing you the resources and the money as much as we'd like to right now, but then hard choices are made two, three, five years from now — you don't get the money, you don't have the quality force that you want. So I think it's reasonable for you to take the position that you're taking.

I also think Ms. Wilson is quite right that the details behind the talking points would be very helpful to this committee, and I suspect that you'll be forthcoming with those, and that frankly I think you're headed in exactly the right direction in that we ought to be not part of the bureaucracy that gets in your way, but part of the bureaucracy that helps you move in that direction.

Out of your lanes, if you could order — suppose you could order any kinds of individuals — not just in the United States, but I specifically have in mind the interagency folks, State Department, you name it — but if you were in a position to order individuals within the United States and outside the United States to move to a war theater like Iraq, and perform certain functions, to assist in the overall objective here, which is securing security and building a nation — which, by the way, our history is not good at — 17 efforts in the 20th century, if I'm not mistaken; three successful — and those were South Korea, Japan and Germany. The rest were not successful. So our history isn't good with regard to this. It's a long-term strategic interest of ours to be in a position to do this. So how do we do it?

It's — Mr. Larsen's observation that this one-to-one, can you transfer an Iraqi, one Iraqi into a U.S. military role and expect that you'd have the same capabilities — in some senses they would greatly exceed our capability. I mean, they're there. They're the ones that have to police that country. We can't do that for them. An alien army, no matter how proficient it is, it's going to really struggle to police a foreign country. So we've got to have the Iraqis stepping in. There's a process that we go through institutionally in order to make that happen. Who do you need there that's not there now that you'd like to be able to order to get over there and do something that would help you out? And I would limit myself to Americans. I suspect that there are others around the world that have comparative advantages over us that we simply can't match.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Well, without going into a War College lecture here — (laughter) — within our own capability, we need to think across all of the elements of national power — diplomatic; informational; military; economic. And of course there's things in between, but those are the major (muscle ?) movements.

Our job, as military people, are to provide the military element of national power, which are principally security based. And our job is to provide a secure environment, and environment in which other kinds of things can happen, the kind of things regardless — and by the way, I think it's important that there's coalition effort, which there is, that there's a wider understanding that this effort in Iraq is a very, very important effort for the future of not only the United States, but the world; and that it's in our best interest to have a coherent country where its populace has bought into a process that they understand and can live with, where we have electrification in the country; we have proper security; we have proper water; we have effective markets; we have all of the kind of great potential that is resident within Iraq coming to bear.

You know, I think those are the kind of capabilities that are going to need to be focused and fine-tuned to make this occur. Our job is to help create a secure environment for those kind of things to happen. That includes not only our presence, but also the efforts that we have in standing up security forces within the country so that they can do much of this for themselves.

REP. SAXTON: Thank you very much, General. Mr. Thornberry.

REP. MAC THORNBERRY (R-TX): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm concerned that this end strength debate masks some deeper and some ways more difficult issues which we need to confront together. General Schoomaker, you mentioned earlier the Guard and Reserve issues, not just how many, but how does what job and how they fit together. Another one which we debated quite a bit last year are personnel policies within the services.

We had a big debate about greater flexibility with the civilian workforce so that they can take over some of the jobs that we now have military folks doing. But within the military services themselves, we have issues like mandatory retirement age; a requirement that if you don't get promoted on a certain scheduled, then you have to leave the service; a two-year rotation where you spend several months learning your job, you do it for about a year, and then you have to rotate out and transfer to somebody else. Aren't there a lot of issues within our personnel policies that require a certain number of people which, if we look at, and I would say update a little bit, it may play into what we can do with a certain end strength.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: The short answer is, transforming our personnel policies is at the center of transformation.

REP. THORNBERRY: I agree.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: If we don't transform our personnel policies, we will not be able to transform the force. And that's why we're trying to stabilize the force; get out of individual replacement; take a look at things like retention-control points; take a look at keeping people in cohesive units for longer periods of time, reducing the turbulence that's self-induced. All of those things are absolutely critical. And you're putting your finger on one of the most important and transformational points, as far as the Army is concerned. And I won't speak for the Marine Corps.

GEN. HAGEE: I would like to align myself with the chief of staff of the Army. He's absolutely right, sir.

REP. THORNBERRY: Well, I think we all together, services and the committee, are going to have to get into those things on this end strength issue.

Thank you.

REP. SAXTON: Mr. Thornberry, thank you very much. Listen, somehow we've run out of questioners here, and so we thank you for your forbearance. We thank you for your generosity with your time and with the straightforward answers that you were able to provide us this morning.

So we'll let you go about your business now. Thank you very much, and we look forward to working with you on these issues as we move forward together.

GEN. HAGEE: Sir, thank you very much.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

END

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